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Reconstructing Sex Offenders as
Mentally Ill: A Labeling Explanation
RUDOLPH ALEXANDER, JR.
The Ohio State University
A growing number of states are being pressured to keep incarcerated sex
offenders behind bars longer. The response to this pressure has been to look to
the mental health system and retrieve civil commitment for sex offenders,
a policy largely abandoned in the 1960s. In the 1970s, the courts ruled
that civil commitment to a mental institution required that the individual
be both mentally ill and dangerous. So legislators, with the support of
a few mental health professionals, met this requirement by legislatively
reconstructing sex offenders as mentally ill and permitting their indefinite
commitment to mental institutions. The author discusses the process of
reconstructing sex offenders as mentally ill from a labeling perspective.
An increasing number of states have sought to control sexual
perpetrators through their commitments to the mental health
system after these perpetrators served criminal sentences (Er-
linder, 1993; LaFond, 1993; Scheingold, Olson, & Pershing, 1993;
Wettstein, 1993). This increase occurred within the last decade as
numerous states passed legislation permitting civil commitment
of sex offenders to mental institutions (Alexander, 1993; Fujimota,
1992). In the past, civil commitment was used for minor sex of-
fenders instead of imprisonment. Now, it is used after a convicted
sex offender has served all of his or her sentence. Alexander
(1995) reported that 14 states and the District of Columbia had
civil commitment statutes, and four states had pending bills in
their legislatures. Each year, a new state adds civil commitment
of convicted sex offenders to its civil statutes (Dowling & Lovitt,
1995). A recent survey of legal codes showed that 17 states had
civil commitment of sex offenders to mental institutions.
In the process of passing civil commitment legislation, legisla-
tors had to reconstruct sex offenders as being mentally ill because
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civil commitment to a mental institution required that a person be
both mentally ill and dangerous (Foucha v. Louisiana, 1992). In the
1960s most states repealed civil commitment laws for sex offend-
ers because of a growing consensus that these offenders were not
mentally ill (Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, 1977). In
the 1970s, the courts held that civil commitment required that a
person be both mentally ill and dangerous (Foucha v. Louisiana,
1992). So, legislatures created new definitions of mental illness
just for sex offenders.
Sociologists have long discussed society's labeling of deviant
behavior and developed the labeling perspective to provide a
framework for understanding the process of deviance making.
The labeling perspective has been used to explain both the crimi-
nalization of deviant behavior and the medicalization of deviant
behavior. It provides a framework for understanding the pro-
cesses involved in states reconstructing sex offenders as mentally
ill because it involved medicalizing deviance.
Deviance, Labeling, and Medicalizing Deviance
Goode (1990) defined deviance as "behavior that some people
in a society find offensive and that excites-or would excite if
it were discovered-in these people disapproval, punishment,
condemnation of, or hostility toward the actor" (p. 24). The most
important factor in the study of deviance is the study of people
who have the power to disapprove, punish, and condemn other
persons. State legislatures and Congress have the power to label
officially because these institutions make laws. They are some-
times assisted by the mental health profession when the deviance
is viewed as a result of a mental disease. Also, the judicial system
(i.e., the trial court and sometimes appellate courts) must sanction
the commitment of an individual to a mental institution. As such,
it sanctions the process of deviance making and gives legal force
to the labeling process.
An intense debate has occurred between persons who
believed in the medical model of mental illness (Henderson &
Kalichman, 1990) and those who believed in the labeling model
(Scheff, 1984). Those who favor the medical perspective state that
it is preposterous to believe that labeling creates deviance, and
those who favor the labeling perspective state that it is erroneous
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to believe that some people have diseased minds which mental
health professionals could uniformly discover. Some aspects of
both perspective are correct, and a modified version of labeling
provides a strong explanation for understanding the process of
deviance making (Goode, 1990).
An essential component of the labeling model is that mental
disorder is a term for a state of mind that supposedly causes
behavior incompatible with one's social environment. The larger
society finds this behavior to be troublesome. The labeling model
provides that mental disorder is not a disease and is the result of a
judgment based on social values. The judgment that someone has
a mental disorder is made primarily on extrapsychiatric factors,
such as one's race, sex, social class, and amount of power. A
large number of persons engage in deviant behaviors, but society
specifically targets only a few persons and rationalizes the same
behaviors in other persons (Scheff, 1984).
The modified version of labeling acknowledged that some
people developed conditions that caused hallucinations and delu-
sions. Edwin Lemert stated long ago that the sociologist was
not primarily concerned with the cause of hallucinations and
delusions, but what it was about these behaviors that caused so-
ciety to shun, segregate, and commit to mental institutions some
persons who have displayed these behaviors. Stigma, labeling,
and societal reactions to behaviors believed to be indicators of
mental disorder are "potent and crucial sociological factors to be
taken into account in influencing the condition of the mentally
disordered" (Goode, 1990, p. 322).
The modified labeling perspective provides that "holding
psychiatric conditions constant, the greater the problems the
mentally disordered individual creates for others, the greater the
likelihood of being labeled as mentally ill and the greater the
likelihood of being institutionalized and treated" (Goode, 1990, p.
323). Furthermore, according to Goode (1990), "as a general rule,
the more deviant an activity is, the greater the likelihood that it
will be medicalized, especially in Western society" (p. 324).
Medicalizing some deviant behavior is not necessarily bad.
For instance, mere addiction to drugs was once criminalized, and
persons who were addicted to drugs could be fined and impris-
oned. The medicalization of addiction caused a policy change,
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and addiction was no longer a crime but an illness deserving
compassion. However, medicalizing deviant behavior has some
negative effects, for example, the depoliticalization of behavior.
Political dissenters in Russia were routinely institutionalized in
mental institutions for criticism of the Russian political system.
According to Conrad (1980), "defining deviant behavior as
a medical problem allows certain things to be done that could
not otherwise be considered; for example, the body may be cut
open or psychoactive medications may be given" (p. 81). This last
effect, the medical social control of deviant behavior, is important
for sex offenders. Medicalizing a sex offender as having a medical
disease permits his or her involuntary commitment from prison
to a mental institution for an indeterminate time.
The preceding discussions regarding deviance, labeling, and
medicalizing deviance provide a framework for understanding
the processes and decisions regarding sex offenders. Before dis-
cussing these processes and decisions, the author describes two
civil commitment statutes. One was passed in the State of Wash-
ington and the other in Minnesota. These states were selected for
several reasons. First, Washington and Minnesota have been the
most active in committing sex offenders to mental institutions.
Second, some states have used the Washington and Minnesota
statutes as models for their statutes. Third, both the Washington
and Minnesota Supreme Courts have ruled regarding the consti-
tutionality of civil commitment for sex offenders.
Civil Commitment Statutes for Sex Offenses
In the late 1930s, Minnesota passed a statute permitting the
civil commitment of a person who was assessed as having a "psy-
chopathic personality" and who was sexually irresponsible. The
Minnesota legislature defined a psychopathic personality as "the
existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability,
or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of
good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of per-
sonal acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render
such person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to
sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons" (In re
Blodgett, 1994, p. 919). Because of the broadness of the statute, the
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Minnesota Supreme Court narrowed the statute to "those persons
who, by habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have
evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses
and who, as a result, are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury,
loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and
uncontrollable desire" (In re Blodgett, 1994, p. 919).
Commitment under this statute could be indefinite or until the
treatment staff at the institution felt that the individual should
be released. Initially, the law was used for persons who were
caught peeping in windows, persons who exposed themselves
publicly, and persons who engaged in consensual homosexual
acts (Halvorsen, 1993). Later, it was applied to more serious of-
fenders. However, unlike during its earlier use, it was targeted at
prisoners who had been convicted of sex offenses and who were
nearing the completion of their criminal sentences (Hall, 1994).
Unlike Minnesota, Washington had to pass new legislation to
commit civilly sex offenders. Also unlike Minnesota, Washington
called its offenders "sexual predators." The Washington statute
was passed after Washington citizens, outraged by two highly
brutal sex crimes, demanded that their legislature pass a bill to
control offenders who prey on women and children. The Gover-
nor formed a task force, which did not have any representatives
from psychiatry, to propose a bill to control sex offenders. The task
force acknowledged that sex offenders did not meet Washing-
ton's civil commitment requirement that was used for ordinary
citizens, which required a mental illness and evidence of a current
act of danger to self or others. The task force acknowledged that
it had to construct a new definition of mental illness that would
include just sex offenders (Reardon, 1992). Despite the opposition
by the Washington State Psychiatric Association, the Washington
legislature passed the bill unanimously and called it the Sexually
Violent Predator Statute (Washington Statute, 71.09.020).
As the statute defined it, a sexually violent predator is "any
person who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of
sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in
predatory acts of sexual violence." Further, mental abnormality
was defined as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person
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to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting
such person a menace to the health and safety of others." Fi-
nally, predatory behaviors were defined as "acts directed towards
strangers or individuals with whom a relationship has been es-
tablished or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization"
(Washington Statute 71.09.020).
The statute provided that a person who has been found to
be a sexual predator by a judge or jury shall be committed to
the Department of Social and Health Services until the person's
mental abnormality or personality disorder was no longer evident
and the person was safe to be in the community. For political
reasons, the statute did not cover family members who sexually
victimized family members, although statistics revealed that chil-
dren were more likely to be sexually assaulted by their relatives
than strangers (Scheingold et al., 1992).
Court Rulings Supporting the Constitutionality
of Committing Sex Offenders as Mentally Ill
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the new use of
civil commitment was upheld (In re Blodgett, 1994), and the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to hear Blodgett's appeal (Blodgett v. Min-
nesota, 1994), establishing the constitutionality of this law. Writing
for the Minnesota majority, Justice John E. Simonett conceded
that psychopathic personality was not medically recognized and
could not be found in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-III-R) (American Psychiatric Association, 1987).
However, it, according to the Justice, constituted more than a so-
cial maladjustment and was a severe mental condition. In Justice
Simonett's opinion, it was analogous to the antisocial personality
disorder in the DSM-III-R with the additional feature of sexual
violence (In re Blodgett, 1994)
In like manner, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld its
violent sexual predator statute. Writing for the majority, Justice
Barbara Durham stated that the Sexual Predator Statute required
that the person designated to be committed must have a mental
abnormality or personality disorder. Justice Durham observed
that mental abnormality was not defined in the DSM-III-R, but the
experts for the State testified that mental abnormality was similar
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to mental disorder. Because the offender was diagnosed as having
paraphilia, he met the statutory definition of being mentally ill (In
re Young, 1993).
The Application of the Labeling Perspective to
Reconstruction of Sex Offenders as Mentally Ill
Goode (1990) provided a key theoretical proposition in the un-
derstanding the medicalization of sexual deviance when he wrote
that the greater the problems created, the greater the likelihood
of being institutionalized. Highly publicized instances of sexual
assaults force a number of citizens to go to their state legislatures
demanding more control of sex offenders. In the State of Wash-
ington, outraged citizens threatened to defeat any politician who
opposed the civil commitment bill (LaFond, 1992). This pressure,
or trouble, created a major problem for politicians, who acceded
to the wishes of the public.
Goode also indicated that certain practices, and persons who
engaged in them, were more likely to be seen as indicators of
mental illness. One of the stated aims of civil commitment was to
protect women and children from sexual perpetrators. An adult's
engaging in sex with a child is deviant behavior and potentially an
indicator of mental illness. "Normal" sex involves two consenting
adults. Thus, the practice of sex between a child and adult is more
likely to be viewed as deviant behavior and a sign of a mental
disorder.
Yet, as the labeling perspective suggests, not all deviant be-
havior will be viewed the same. The Washington legislature pur-
posely excluded parents, grandparents, or uncles who may have
repeatedly sexually abused a child relative. These persons were
not to be viewed as predators and were excluded from the defi-
nition of a predator and indefinite civil commitment in a mental
institution.
Another example of how similar sexual behaviors is viewed
differently by persons empowered to label and medicalize de-
viant behavior is illustrated by marriage laws, and this difference
supports another aspect of labeling. For instance, a number of
states permit adolescents as young as 13, 14, and 15 to marry with
the consent of the adolescents' parents or legal guardians (Laws
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of Puerto Rico Annotated @ 31-242; Montana Code Annotated @
40-1-213; North Carolina General Statute @ 51-2; Virginia Code
Annotated @ 20-48; Wyoming Statute Annotated @ 20-1-102;).
Thus, a 30- or 40-year-old male could marry a 13-year-old female,
and sex between them would be normal behavior. However, an
unmarried couple of the same ages as the above example could
lead to a criminal sentence and civil commitment to a mental
institution. The absence of a marriage license could mean that
the man had a mental disorder because he was having sex with
a child. The labeling perspective explains the differentiation in
these situations.
Although state appellate court Justices are supposed to apply
the law to a given set of circumstances, they are not above political
pressures. The decisions to uphold Minnesota and Washington's
civil commitment statutes for sex offenders were not unanimous,
but a majority of the Justices of each court supported the recon-
struction process. In the trial courts where the civil commitment
process began, expert testimonies were offered by both sides.
Both states' mental health professionals testified that the sex of-
fenders under consideration were mentally ill. Yet, the defense
attorneys for each man produced credible, expert testimony that
these offenders were not mentally ill. The majority Justices in each
state completely ignored the testimony of the defense and chose
to concur with the state's experts. In additionally, the Justices
enhanced their conclusions that sex offenders were mentally ill
by referring to the DSM-III-R. The majority Justices in both states
acknowledged that the DSM-I1-R did not support the legislative
definitions, but they constructed definitions anyway to support
their ruling that sex offenders were mentally ill.
Last, Conrad (1981) stated that medicalizing deviant behav-
iors permitted the state to do something that otherwise could
not be done without the label of mental illness. His conclusion
is strongly supported with respect to sex offenders. Convicted
sex offenders must be released from prison after serving their
sentences. A sex offender who has a ten year sentence must be
released at the end of that sentence. By legislators and a few men-
tal health professionals' labeling sex offenders as mentally ill, the
state may confine sex offenders indefinitely in mental institution
and do not have to release them. Without the mental illness label,
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they must be released. With it, they can be confined for the rest of
their lives. Thus, Conrad's proposition that medicalizing deviant
behaviors permits the state to do something that otherwise could
not be done is certainly supported.
Implications of Labeling Sex Offenders as Mentally Ill
The success of labeling sex offenders as mentally ill has im-
plications for other troublesome, deviant behavior. For instance,
the stalking of women has begun to receive considerable atten-
tion (Darby, 1995; Ellis, 1995; Stadler, 1995; Zorn, 1995), forcing
legislatures to make it a crime (Code of Alabama @ 13A-6-90;
Alaska Statute @ 11.41.260; Arkansas Revised Statute @ 13-2923;
California Penal Code @ 646.9). In most states, stalking is a felony,
and in some states it is a misdemeanor. If some stalkers continued
in their behavior after serving a criminal sentence, undoubtedly,
calls will be made to do more to keep stalkers behind bars. Prison
sentences could be toughened, but civil commitment also be-
comes a policy choice, provided a psychologist or psychiatrist is
willing to conclude that stalking is evidence of a mental disorder.
However, the labeling perspective would suggest that not all
stalkers would be civilly committed to mental institutions. As
Goode wrote, the deviant label would not be applied to all persons
who engaged in the deviant behavior. In situations where the
stalkers are former husbands, for instance, legislators are unlikely
to pass laws making these offenders eligible for civil commitment
for an indefinite period. The reason for this proposition is that
these situations involve intimates, and there is a tendency to
view their behaviors differently. Legislators would exempt these
offenders like that they exempted family members who sexually
abused minor relatives. A plausible hypothesis from the label-
ing perspective is that strangers who stalk are more likely to be
viewed as mentally ill than former husbands who stalk their ex-
wives or men who stalk their former girlfriends.
The possibility of other criminal behavior being viewed as
signs of mental illness so as to continue offenders' incarceration
is not remote. For instance, a New Jersey politician proposed that
all violent criminals in prison be eligible for civil commitment
after they have completed their prison sentences (Wilson, 1994).
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For this to occur, all that would be needed are a few mental health
professionals willing to diagnose the prisoners as having a mental
disorder and dangerous to the public. Then, these offenders could
be legislatively constructed as mentally ill like sex offenders have
been done.
There are other implications for legislating sex offenders as
mentally ill. It retrieves the medical model of understanding crim-
inal behavior for one type of crime. Woman advocates have de-
clared that rape and other forms of sexual assaults are acts of
violence, not sex, and should be treated as other violent crimes.
Yet, the growing policy of viewing sex offenders as mentally ill
challenges this perspective. Another implication is that it may
open the door to a new legal defense in sexual assault cases. If
some sex offenders have, as Minnesota calls it, uncontrolled and
uncontrollable sexual impulses, then these offenders lack free will
and should not be sanctioned by the criminal justice system. Some
criminal defendants have avoided conviction and punishment
under the theory that they had an irresistible impulse to commit
their deeds.
Conclusion
The labeling perspective does not enjoy wide support among
academicians. It may not have neatly derived concepts and hy-
potheses that can be easily tested. However, it provides a useful
framework for understanding how some phenomena are viewed.
It certainly helps to explain how future, yet to be discovered
problems may become medicalized so as the state can exert more
social control.
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